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Juridical Transformation as Process: A Comment on Stone 
Sweet 
 
 
Neil Walker∗ 
 
 
 
In his short but highly suggestive paper, Alec Stone Sweet raises and addresses 
some deeply engaging and important questions about the nature and implications 
of the involvement of the judicial branch in certain recent fundamental 
transformations of the legal systems of Western Europe. Basically, he wants to 
develop and to link two propositions. The first concerns the discovery of a 
particular sub-category of coups d’ état which he calls “juridical” (as opposed to 
“revolutionary”) in light of the fact that they are accomplished though adjudication 
and under an exercise of power that - as a matter of form if not substance - has been 
properly delegated to the judicial authority under the constitution and the basic 
norm.  The second concerns the type of authority deficit and conflict that is 
reckoned to flow from such juridical coups d’ état. He claims that, the judicial organ 
(self) empowered by the coup d’ état may not possess the wherewithal to complete 
the work of transformation it has begun,   as it typically lacks the “direct, 
jurisdictional means of obtaining obedience from a second organ, whose exercise of 
authority is necessary to render the law made by the first (judicial) organ effective.” 
 
I have much sympathy with the general thrust of Stone Sweet’s argument. His 
work has always been remarkable for its insight into the circumstances and 
practices through which judges emerge as more significant political actors than 
legal texts or conventional wisdom would countenance, and by his systematically 
ambitious use of a comparative methodology in order to find the highest pitch and 
broadest range for his explanations of this phenomenon. The present piece, with its 
situation of the French and German national examples alongside the European 
supranational example, is no exception. In the final analysis, however, the paper is 
in danger of claiming both too much and too little. It is in danger of claiming too 
much insofar as it may be overconfident in its identification of a distinct category of 
transformative event – the juridical coup - as the axis of explanation. It is in danger 
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of claiming too little in that preoccupation with the question of the coup threatens to 
deflect attention from the real meat of the paper – its appreciation of the self-
reinforcing dynamic underpinning the problem of judicial authority in conditions 
of constitutional flux, regardless of the precise origins of such flux.  Let me briefly 
develop both of these points. 
 
The key to - and the key difficulty with - the definition of a juridical coup d’état lies 
in the notion of a “fundamental transformation” in the normative foundations of a 
legal system. Stone Sweet offers two cumulative criteria for defining such a 
transformation. The first criterion is one of principle, the second of degree or extent. 
The criterion of principle holds that a transformation is fundamental if we can 
“infer, reasonably, that the constitutional law produced by the transformation 
would have been rejected by the founders had it been placed on the negotiating 
table”. The criterion of degree holds that the “outcome must alter- fundamentally – 
how the legal system operates, again in ways…demonstrably intended by the 
framers”. Neither of these criteria is free of problems.  
 
The first criterion is explicitly postulated as a counterfactual - “had it been placed 
on...the table”. Nevertheless, Stone Sweet assumes that the harder test incorporates 
the easier one – that if there is actual evidence of rejection by the framers of the later 
development, as there was quite emphatically in the (French) case of the 
incorporation of a justiciable Charter of Rights and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in 
the (German) case of the pervasiveness of constitutional values, then that counts 
even higher on the scale of persuasion than  reasonable inference on the basis of 
counterfactual reasoning. That is reasonable enough, provided we do not 
underestimate the methodological problems of identifying and sifting the relevant 
evidence even where such is a factual record of the framers’ intent1, and provided, 
of course, that we do not make the additional, and much harder and more 
controversial claim, that framers’ intent, or originalism, is the only or best moral 
basis for interpreting the constitution.  
 
Matters become more difficult, however, where direct evidence is lacking and we 
have to rely exclusively on a counterfactual approach. Absent the best evidence, 
from what are we to infer the likelihood of rejection if the framers had been 
confronted with the question? Textualism cannot provide the whole answer, since it 
is precisely the absence of clear textual words that is at the root of the problem. 
Other evidence might include the general political climate and tradition, though by 
its nature this is often highly speculative. Or we may look to the broader structure 
of the constitutional arrangements enacted in the text, which at least has the merit 
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of grounding analysis in the relevant legal materials. Yet if we go down that track, 
the danger beckons that, while we may end up better informed of the relevant 
arguments, we may be no clearer as to the right answer. For example, to take 
European supranationalism - as the one case under inquiry where no direct 
evidence of framers’ intent is invoked – Stone Sweet nevertheless assumes that the 
counterfactual evidence points to the rejection of any original mandate for the 
‘constitutional’ project of direct effect and supremacy. This is certainly a reasonable 
position, but it is by no means unassailable. Recently, for instance, the explicitly 
structural argument that the provisions on the preliminary reference procedure and 
on the direct applicability of regulations in the Treaty of Rome imply an original 
template based on supremacy and direct effect has been powerfully restated2. The 
instant point is not to back that argument against Stone Sweet’s, but merely to show 
that the counterfactual approach leaves the matter both of the most appropriate 
type of evidence to pursue and of its best interpretation more open than is 
comfortable to serve the purpose of a clear coup-identifying criterion. 
 
But perhaps Stone Sweet is making life too difficult for himself. Perhaps he can 
avoid the vexed and backward-looking question of counterfactuals altogether and 
rely instead entirely on the second criterion, namely the forward-looking test of 
“fundamental” alteration in the operation of the legal system. After all, this seems 
to get to the heart of what we are interested in when we talk about a coup – namely 
the degree and extent of  abrupt qualitative change in the working of a system 
rather than that system’s fidelity or otherwise to a recondite and  disputable text. 
But precisely because what is “fundamental” is a question of degree and extent 
means that there are problems of uncertainty here too. Stone Sweet, again 
reasonably enough, wants to concentrate on the systemic dimension of 
transformation, in particular  departure from traditional separation of power 
models and the alteration of the existing institutional balance – including, in all 
three cases,  the self-authorized expansion in the scope of authority by a specialized 
constitutional court. But none of this helpful fleshing out of what is important can 
transform a matter of degree into a categorical distinction. 
 
Does any of this really matter? Might the author not reply that he has already 
conceded in the original article that “uncertainty about what should count as 
juridical coup d’état is inevitable”? And can he not plead that the existence of 
marginal cases undermines neither the efficacy nor the value of the distinction 
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between a coup and any of the many lesser species of judicial creativity we 
habitually confront?  
 
I would certainly accept that we have to find a way of distinguishing those forms of 
judicial initiative which have important consequences for system destabilization 
and transformation from those which do not, and that if we are in the business of 
understanding and accounting for large-scale socio-political change we sacrifice an 
important explanatory insight if we dump every act of ‘creative’ law–making in the 
same analytical basket. All the same, it seems to me that the difference Stone Sweet 
is getting at is better captured in more-or-less than yes-or-no terms. Partly, this is 
simply an epistemological point. There are just too many hard cases for us to be 
confident that penumbra will not crowd out the core - including a whole open-
ended class of ‘substantive-doctrinal-but–with-structural-implications’ cases 
introduced by the author himself through the example of Griswold v. Connecticut, 
where the development of a new substantive textual right of privacy had clear 
knock-on effects both for the power of the US Supreme Court and the federal-state 
balance of powers.  
 
Yet partly too - and this is my second line of argument - even if we managed to 
isolate the juridical coup in our conceptual laboratory it is not clear what the 
explanatory purchase of that move would be. It seems to me that the main promise 
of Stone Sweet’s line of argument, and one that has clear continuities with the 
broadly neo-functionalist approach with which much of his other work is 
associated, is to extend our understanding of how judicial initiative in 
circumstances of incomplete authority, as he defines it, can develop its own 
momentum and can set in motion a self-justifying and self-reinforcing dynamic 
both within and between particular courts. Whether we are talking about France’s 
incomplete Bill of Rights, or Germany’s incomplete constitutional jurisdiction, or 
the EU’s incomplete constitutional structure, what we can see is a progressive 
dance of adaptation to the problem of incompleteness, with each judicial step both 
offering a way forward and also exposing new gaps, for which the need for closure 
justifies yet further steps.    
 
What this does is to place the analytical emphasis very much on the post-initiative 
stage, on secondary and tertiary consequences rather than on first causes. And so 
there is a danger that if we nonetheless insist too much on privileging first causes in 
the overall conceptual scheme, we may end up with a distorting confusion of cause 
and effect. For if we look again at each of the cases under analysis, what is striking 
is the extent to which  judicial initiative looks more transformative – more coup-like 
– if we treat it as a process rather than an event. In the European and French cases 
in particular, it is difficult to pinpoint just one pivotal moment. Rather, what we 
observe is a cluster of key cases, which taken as a whole trigger the transformation 
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of the system. But if that is the case, are we not overstretching the meaning of coup – 
supposedly a sudden, event-specific transformation? What is more, within such a 
cluster of cases - take for example the relationship between Van Gend en Loos (direct 
effect) and Costa (supremacy) in the European context - is the logic of progression 
not always and already one of response to incomplete authority? And if that is the 
case, even if we were to stretch our semantic understanding of a coup to cover a key 
cluster spread over time, would there not be a misleading redundancy in dressing 
up as an independent ‘cause’ something which operates in accordance with 
precisely the same logic as the ‘effect’ it seeks to explain? 
 
In conclusion, I would repeat that I am far from out of sympathy with Alec Stone 
Sweet’s project, or with the inventiveness with which he has pursued it. Indeed, it 
is precisely because I find the second part of his analysis - his discussion of the  
authority problem – powerful and  intriguing in its own right that I doubt whether 
the idea of the juridical coup d’état is worth the considerable trouble it would take to 
attempt its adequate operationalization.  
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